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Summary 
This report reviews governance issues of modern biotechnology. The study used two case studies of 
transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize to examine how governance issues influence household and national 
food security in the country. The report argues that for biotechnology to engender food security in Kenya 
in the context of globalisation and international governance, the national context for biotechnology has to 
be facilitative. More specifically, there is need to synchronise biotechnology development with national 
development imperatives taking into account structural limitations that could negate gains made through 
biotechnology activities.  
Five key findings emerge from this report. First, alleviating rural poverty and food insecurity in Kenya 
requires changes at the local, national and international levels because of the inter-connectedness of 
agricultural systems and development in general. Second, developments in agricultural biotechnology will 
require slow and careful policy planning and implementation in order to improve food security of 
smallholders and reduce possible negative and socio-economic impacts of technology. Third, the Kenyan 
public sector will continue to play an important role in the biotechnology development because this area of 
research is crucial to the national and local interests. Fourth, the transfer of agricultural biotechnology to 
developing countries as advocated by international agencies and their national collaborators is a risky 
undertaking, particularly when it proceeds faster than the capacity of the state to cope with the 
management of new knowledge. Fifth and finally, while recognising that agricultural biotechnology has 
potential to alleviate food insecurity in rural Kenya, its programmes must be strongly linked to the 
interests of smallholders and institutions that support local participation. 
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1  Introduction 
Kenya is faced with the twin problems of declining production and distribution of available food. The 
country’s leading agricultural research institute, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) has 
been responding to such agriculture and food production constraints by seeking to harness the potential 
of modern biotechnology through public and private partnerships and commercialisation of its services. 
But the progress has been slow. 
Agricultural biotechnology in Kenya is characterised by low-technology applications such as 
biofertilisers, micropropagation and use of molecular assisted selection (MAS), however, and the country 
is experiencing an increased number of agricultural R&D activities in high-tech biotechnology options. 
These include work on transgenic sweet potato, Bt maize and recombinant DNA livestock vaccines and 
diagnostics. The introduction of these applications in Kenya has stimulated debate on globalisation issues 
(including equity and governance of IPRs, biosafety, investments and trade) and their potential impacts on 
food security in the country. 
This study uses secondary literature and a case study approach to review elements of globalisation 
and international governance of modern agricultural biotechnology and to assess their potential impact on 
the local and national food security in Kenya. The report provides some background to the agriculture 
and food production trends in Kenya in Section 2. This is followed by an analysis of the policy and 
institutional context for agricultural biotechnology in Kenya. Section 4 reviews some of biotechnology 
programmes and regulations that have recently been introduced into Kenya, or are being considered as 
means of alleviating food insecurity in the country. Section 5 briefly describes two case studies of 
agricultural biotechnology introductions, namely transgenic sweet potato and Bt Maize. The cases were 
selected because they represent biotechnology R&D-inspired innovation process, which challenges the 
traditional role of the state and of rural livelihoods, as we know them today. In Section 6, we examine 
how the transfer of transgenic sweet potato and Bt Maize to Kenya have contributed to the national 
agricultural biotechnology policy and regulations, and their potential impacts on food security in the 
country. The report concludes with a summary of key issues and lessons learned. 
 
2  Agricultural production in Kenya 
 
2.1 Overview of agriculture production 
Agriculture is an important sector in Kenya’s economy. It contributes 26 per cent of GDP and generates 
60 per cent of total foreign exchange earnings. Agriculture provides seventy per cent of Kenya’s 
employment. Consequently, agriculture creates jobs and increases incomes. As such, it has, and is 
expected to have for many years to come, an important and direct relationship with respect to 
development efforts to eliminate poverty and food insecurity. Furthermore, agriculture in Kenya provides 
70 per cent of the raw materials for agro-based industries, which in turn account for 70 per cent of all the 
industries in the country. Agricultural production can therefore stimulate growth in other sectors. With an 
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estimated growth multiplier of 1.6, compared to 1.23 in non-agriculture, it is likely to also maintain a 
strong indirect effect on Kenya’s overall economic development.  
However, agricultural production has gradually declined since mid 1980s and more rapidly in the past 
five years. It declined from 4.6 per cent in 1960 to less than 1 per cent in the 1990s. Further, the sector’s 
contribution to GNP dropped from 35 per cent to 28 per cent during the same period (Republic of 
Kenya 2000). Notably, the production of major food crops, such as maize, rice, wheat and sorghum 
dropped significantly.  
This has resulted in more public expenditure on food imports. Maize production declined from 
2.2 m. metric tons (from here abbreviated as MT (24 m. bags)2 in 1996 to 1.98 million MT (22 million 
bags) in 2000, forcing the government to import 360,000 MT (4 million bags) at Sh4.7 billion. In the same 
period, 636, 000 MT (7.1 million bags) of wheat were imported at Sh7 billion. Wheat is the second most 
important crop after maize, but its production levels fall far below that of its consumption. Kenya 
produces 270,000 MT (3 million bags) against the national demand of 540,000 MT (6 million bags) per 
year.  
The production decline is not limited to major cereals but also extends to traditional food crops such 
as sorghum, millet, beans, cowpeas, pigeon peas and grams. Sorghum and millet are indigenous cereals to 
Africa with Sudan as their Centre of Diversity (CoD). They are adaptable to agro-ecological zones of 
Kenya because of their drought-resistance and good performance on a range of poor soils with low 
rainfall. Sorghum production has declined from 175,000 ha with an output of 108,000 MT (1.2 m. bags) in 
1994 to 123,184 ha with an output of 90,000 MT (1 m. bags) in 1999.  
The production of pulses (including beans, cowpeas, pigeon peas and grams) is also on a downward 
trend in terms of area and output. For instance, bean production in 1993 was 405,000 MT (4.5 million 
bags) from an area of 628,000 ha. But it declined to 135,000 MT (1.5 m. bags) from an area of 647,000 ha 
in 1997. In part, the decline in the production of pulses is attributed to adverse weather conditions, 
especially the El Niňo rains in late 1997. Whereas the production of cereals and pulses has declined, the 
production of roots and tubers such as potatoes and sweet potatoes has gradually increased in the past 
decade. However, cassava experienced a drastic production decline (see Figure 2.1). 
Overall, agricultural growth in Kenya has declined substantially in the past decade. Only the 
horticultural industry has experienced reasonable growth over the same period. Horticulture production 
in Kenya includes vegetables, fruits, nuts, cut flower, herbs and spices. Analysis of Ministry of Agriculture 
and Regional Development (MOARD) data suggests that 92 per cent of horticulture produce is 
consumed locally, thus contributing to food security and employment. Horticulture also provides raw 
materials for agro-food processing industries and is a key export sub-sector. At an annual growth rate of 
15–20  per cent,  the sub-sector has grown rapidly in two decades.  Indeed,  the foreign exchange earnings 
                                                 
2  One metric tonne (or 1MT) is equivalent to 1000 kilograms (or 1000kg). The calculation is based on a 90-kg 
bag. 
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from horticulture have grown at an annual rate of 20 per cent and now stand at Ksh.14 billion. This rapid 
growth has been attributed to high global demand and appropriate policies (or lack of government 
intervention), which have encouraged private sector participation. 
 
Figure 2.1 Percentage change in production of selected crops 
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Source: Computed from MOARD, Kenya Food Situation Reports 1990–2000. 
 
2.2 Factors affecting food production  
At the macro-level, the Government of Kenya’s policy on agriculture has proven ineffective, despite the 
fact that this sector is central to the country’s economy. Some analysts argue that the government stresses 
the issue of food self-sufficiency in policy but in practice, the agricultural sector has not been given the 
attention it deserves in raising domestic food production and contributing to national accounts (Institute 
of Economic Affairs et al. 2001). The weak implementation of newly formulated policies on natural 
resources (including master plans for environment, water and forestry) exacerbates poverty in Kenya. The 
rural poor, and particularly women, often have no access to land and security of tenure. The numbers of 
men, women and youth who are landless squatters make up the poorest of the rural and peri-urban 
population. As Bates (1989) suggests, inequitable access to and rights over land reflect historical factors 
and weaknesses in land administration as much as failure of the market.  
At the micro-level in Kenya, the high prices of inputs including labour, and lack of access to credit, 
by the majority of small holder farmers, has impacted negatively on investments in food crop production. 
For instance, the high cost of farm inputs, especially fertilisers, pesticides, spray equipment mitigates 
against smallholder farmers’ ability to procure these inputs in quantities required for the hybrid seeds 
(Institute of Economic Affairs et al. 2001). 
The distribution of stockists of these inputs is also inadequate, leading to high prices and scarcity in 
certain food-producing areas of the country. This is in part due to the poor provision of physical 
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infrastructure such good road network and maintenance of the existing roads to link agricultural areas and 
markets. The result is high transport costs for agricultural inputs and outputs (Omamo 1998). 
 
2.3 Implications for agricultural research and extension 
There are problems of inadequate research results, non-availability of quality seeds and inappropriate 
production technologies especially for smallholder farmers. The quality of seed, if available, is poor and 
susceptible to pests and diseases. The seeds also have low germination rates and are often adulterated and 
of low product quality, yielding low prices. At the same time, this category of farmers lack capable 
organisation to demand adequate quality research as well as efficiently distribute available seeds and other 
inputs among resource-poor farmers. Inadequate and low levels of research also result in the lack of high 
yielding varieties, and disease free planting materials to compensate the farmers’ labour efforts.  
Dry weather conditions also predispose the crops to high incidence of infestation.3 Some diseases 
are common, and could, with the appropriate support to smallholders, be controlled by improved 
agronomic practices such as integrated pest management. Yet, most often the associated costs are 
prohibitive. Under these circumstances, small farmers are often faced with total crop failure or reduced 
yields.  
Another cause of low agricultural production is the inefficient rural extension systems. In the past, 
small farmers relied on the government extension service, which was free, although in Kenya, as in many 
developing countries, agricultural extension was rarely universally accessible to all farmers, and especially 
to women (Poats et al. 1988). Structural adjustment programmes and the associated partial or fully 
privatised extension services recently instituted in Kenya have not increased resource-poor farmers’ access 
to agricultural inputs. While not yet sufficiently investigated, the current transition in rural extension 
services in Kenya is believed to have contributed to decline in food production over the past few years, 
especially in more marginal areas of the country (Nyariki and Thirtle 2000).  
According to sources at the Ministry of Agriculture, the country’s new National Extension Policy 
(NEP) has acknowledged these gaps and attempted to shift from prescriptive to educational methods in 
providing technical advice to farmers, typically through farmers’ organisations and women’s groups. The 
NEP puts emphasis on providing farmers with the necessary skills and ability to identify opportunities for 
improving farm productivity and to seek out, test and ultimately adopt technologies appropriate to their 
particular social and agro-ecological conditions. It remains to be seen however, how this policy will be 
able to respond to the challenges confronting Kenyan agriculture, especially those associated with 
biotechnology. 
 
                                                 
3  For instance, such as cutworm, potato tuber moth, woolly aphids, diamond back moth.  
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3  Policy and institutional environment 
 
3.1 Science and technology policy 
The government of Kenya had, since the mid 1980s, embarked on structural adjustment programmes, 
which sought to spur economic growth through export orientation, and investment in modern science 
and technology and public management practices for reviving the country’s agricultural economy. 
Although Kenya has a broad S&T policy constituency, it lacks a specific national policy and legal 
framework on biotechnology. The National Council for Science and Technology has recently is in the 
process of drafting a national biotechnology policy but this is yet to be finalised. While biotechnology 
R&D is evolving rapidly in a policy vacuum, no consideration has been made to mainstream the 
technology into national planning and development instruments. For example, biotechnology is not 
mentioned in the current Development Plan (2002–2008), although it was mentioned for the first time, as 
a specific policy for agricultural development, in Kenya’s Seventh Development Plan (1994–1996): 
 
The application of biotechnology in agriculture and livestock production will be nurtured and 
developed. 
(GOK 1994–6: 127) 
 
A certain level of political will has been demonstrated. For instance, in 2000, President Moi wrote a letter 
of request to President Clinton for technical assistance to Kenya in the area of biotechnology capacity 
building. This has been read to imply that, at the highest level, the Kenyan State appreciates and supports 
the role biotechnology in the country’s development. Political commitment in terms of increased 
allocation of financial resources to biotechnology R&D is however uncertain, and even some analysts 
believe inadequate (ISNAR 2000).  
Policy makers often make ad hoc policy-related statements on biotechnology during national or 
international events or meetings. This has led to fragmentation and poor communication of the 
biotechnology R&D agenda among various actors in the National Agricultural Research System (NARS). 
For instance, many of the recent biotechnology initiatives in the public research sector reflect the interests 
of the concerned individuals or particular institutions – with minimum inter-organisational interactions or 
synergy. Therefore, modern biotechnology activities in the country are influenced by institutional 
preferences and donor funding, which is not necessarily guided by or aligned to national priorities 
(Anyango and Shiundu 1999). 
 
3.2 The national agricultural research system of Kenya 
Biotechnology applications in Kenya have occurred within an existing historical and structured system of 
national agricultural research. The system is characterised mainly by conventional technology, public 
goods research, multiple internal and external stakeholders and centralised and hierarchical organisation 
including national research institutes like the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), several 
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universities, numerous NGOs, producer associations and very many community based organisations 
representing resource-poor smallholder farmers. 
It is argued that the legacy of using “technological fixes” to achieve national development makes top-
down approaches a persistent feature in Kenya’s agriculture research system (Mwangi 1998). This 
tendency disregards the livelihoods of rural communities whose own institutions are rendered invisible. With 
respect to the emergence of modern agricultural biotechnology in Kenya weak governance structures and 
processes, and ambiguity about the existence of a clear and comprehensive policy for the efficient and 
effective coordination of biotechnology research in the country, further exacerbate the situation. This in turn 
affects the capacity of Kenya to participate effectively in regional, as well as international biotechnology 
collaborative efforts.  
In Table 3.1, a survey of organisation conducted by Odame and Mbote (2000) summarises the 
organisational synergy or productive (not nominal) inter-organisational interactions within the Kenyan 
NARS with respect to modern biotechnology. This study reveals that the highest number of ties between 
organisations involves international agricultural research institutes (IARCs) having their head offices in 
Nairobi. These include the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), International Centre on 
Research and Agroforestry (ICRAF), International Centre for Insect Pest and Ecology (ICIPE) or having 
regional offices (CIMMYT, CIP and ISAAA) in Nairobi. Of second level importance were inter-
organisational interactions involving NARIs (including KARI), which account for 32 of the estimated 52 ties. 
There are 50 ties to the universities, with 19 and 14 ties to NGOs and the private sector respectively. 
About 158 (70 per cent) of all the ties are linked to the three organisational categories namely, 
international agencies, NARIs and universities. Ties to other organisational categories were 36 (16 per 
cent) and 33 (14 per cent) for the government agencies and NGOs/private sector respectively. This 
demonstrates the dominance of research networks in S&T policy. It further confirms the prominence of 
upstream institutional linkages in the production of public goods research. In terms of tie performance, 
with the exception of ties to the government agencies (which are rated fair at 2.83), most of the scores fall 
within the range of good (3.04 to 3.37).  
The ties to KARI are rated fair at 2.96 and to the other NARIs are rated good (at 3.15). A large 
number of ties are reported to be informal (inter-personal relationships). Even where respondents 
indicated existence of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), they were not sure about the contents of 
these linkage agreements. 
Notably, farmers’ organisations and agencies whose members are resource-poor farmers are absent 
or silent in the networks of S&T policy. Integrating biotechnology into existing structure may not 
necessarily result in the generation and retention of appropriate or profitable innovations for smallholders 
suggests Bunders et al. (1991). A more interactive, bottom-up approach is recommended, but such an 
approach is primarily concerned with methodological issues in needs assessment and priority-setting phases 
of biotechnological innovation process. There is still little work in the Kenyan context that analyses farmers’ 
experiences and local-level consequences of biotechnology innovations. Given the uncertainty surrounding 
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biotechnology, there are persistent concerns over farmer representation and participation in terms of type 
and level of decision-making. As we shall see in the next section, the extent to which institutions might 
influence interactions between researchers and farmers further adds to this uncertainty. 
 
Table 3.1 Organisational synergy in Kenyan biotechnology 
Organisation category Number of ties to sector Average score of tie 
performance b 
University 50 3.20 
NARIsa 52 3.04 
NGOs  19 3.37 
Private  14 3.37 
International 56 3.37 
Government 36 2.83 
Total  227  
 
Note:  a: KARI (ties =32 and score = 2.96), Other NARIs (ties =20 and score = 3.15); b: 1= poor; 2= fair; 
3= good; 4=very good; 5=excellent  
Source: Odame and Mbote (2000). 
 
4  Agricultural biotechnology in Kenya 
 
4.1 Traditional to modern biotechnology 
Biotechnology in Kenya is taking place within the context of an established agricultural R&D system. The 
advent of traditional biotechnology applications such as biofertilisation, tissue culture and molecular 
markers, and their ease of integration into existing conventional plant and animal breeding have provided 
an opportunity for addressing the problems of poverty, hunger and malnutrition. These applications do 
not require advanced laboratory facilities and specially trained scientists. In particular, the use of traditional 
biological processes, such as fermentation and biological nitrogen fixation (BNF) in Kenya is a long-
standing practice. Since the early 1960s, European farmers in Kenya, through the Kenya Farmers 
Association (KFA), were importing BNF for production of soya bean and fodder legumes in the country. 
The use of tissue culture began in the early 1980s with its incorporation into the production of pyrethrum 
and citrus by KARI and the University of Nairobi respectively. But these projects were simply added on 
to conventional breeding programmes. 
A systematic evaluation of biotechnology in the country was initiated 1990, when the government 
appointed a National Advisory Committee on Biotechnology Advances and Their Applications 
(NACBAA). The objectives of NACBAA were to: 
 
1) Identify national priorities on the basis of comparative advantage and ability to implement traditional 
methods in small scale agriculture;  
2) Facilitate rapid access to new germplasm; 
8 
3) Reduce high costs of agricultural inputs; and 
4) Gain access to cheaper and more environmentally friendly alternative. 
 
The Committee completed the study and reported its findings to the government towards the end of 
1990. Among its key findings, NACBAA identified immediate applications in tissue culture for mass 
propagation and disease elimination, development of disease diagnostic kits, and the use of biological 
inoculates as priorities. The Committee further identified and recommended some areas of plant genetic 
transformation for various biotic and abiotic stress and at capacity building needs at various levels. It 
recommended that without technical and regulatory capacity, the viability of modern biotechnology in 
Kenya was uncertain. But the findings and recommendations of NACBAA were not implemented due to 
lack of funding. 
In 1993, the Biotechnology Program of the Netherlands Directorate-General for International 
Cooperation (DGIS) took a different approach to biotechnology policy and programme development by 
implementing on a pilot basis a special social science research project in four countries: Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
India and Colombia. The overall aim of the programme was to help alleviate poverty through 
biotechnology research and implementation in a way that takes grassroots interests into account. 
(Wekundah 2000) It is one of the few development programs that are directed exclusively towards 
biotechnology and poverty alleviation. Like NACBAA, this programme also prioritised policy 
developments in biosafety and capacity building.  
Unlike the NACBAA priorities which were not implemented by the government due lack of funding, 
KABP received US$4.2 m from Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS). 
The programme has since the mid 1990s supported eight biotechnology research projects: potato, cassava 
and sweet potato, citrus, macadamia, banana, marker assisted breeding (MAB) in maize, biopesticides, 
animal health and institutional support.  
At US$1.1 MAB in maize received the most funding within the programme. The average funding for 
each of the other projects was US$300,000 (Odame and Mbote 2000). At US$2 million, the transgenic 
sweet potato project represents the largest single biotechnology research contribution by the private 
sector (Monsanto). The implementation of the Bt Maize project by KARI, CIMMYT and Norvatis 
Foundation, under the auspices of the Insect Resistance Maize for Africa (IRMA), is estimated to have 
cost US$6 million over a five-year period (IRMA 2000). 
Kenya Trypanosomiasis Research Institute (KETRI) has since the early 1990s, received public 
funding of US$ 2,570,000 from IAEA for livestock disease control and US$100,000 from DFID for 
trypanosomiasis tolerance research. Due to geographical proximity, Kenya also benefits from research 
activities of supranational organisation such as ICRAF, ILRI, ICIPE and ISAAA. For instance, ILRI 
spends approximately US$6 million per year on biotechnology-related livestock research. Some research 
organisation and farmers in Kenya may benefit through their collaborations with ILRI and other centres. 
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Table 4.1 Selected biotechnology projects and funding 
Organisation Commodity/pol Objective Technique Funding source Level of funding
(US$) 
UoN-Soils & 
Botany 
Beans, soy 
bean 
Nitrogen 
Fixation 
Biofertilisers. Various Na 
JKUAT -
Biotech 
Bananas, sweet 
potato, cassava 
Micro-
propagation 
Tissue culture BTA/DGIS 250,000 
      
KEFRI Multi-purpose 
tree species 
Micro-
propagation 
Tissue culture EU 382,000 
TRF, Oserian 
co. 
Tea, cut flowers Micro-
propagation 
Tissue culture Company Na 
KARI, KEPHIS Pyrethrum, 
potato, 
sweetpotato 
Micro-
propagation 
Tissue culture Government Na 
KARI-
Katumani 
Maize Drought-
tolerance 
Marker techno. BTA/DGIS 1100,000 
KARI-
Katumani 
Bt Maize Insect-
resistance 
Bt Technology Norvatis Found. 4,000,000 
KARI  Transgenic 
sweet potato 
Disease-
resistance 
DNA 
Technology 
Monsanto/other
s 
2.000.000 
KARI-NVRC Livestock Disease control    
KETRI Livestock Disease control  
Tryps. -
resistance 
 IAEA 
DFID  
2570,000 
100,000 
TRF  Tea Gene Mapping Marker techno Brooke Bond 
Ltd. 
 
      
ICRAF Priority tree 
species 
Biodiversity Marker techno. CGIAR Na 
ILRI Livestock Biodiv./diseases DNA 
Technology 
CGIAR  6,000,000 
      
KIPI IPRs Training Short courses WIPO Na 
NCST Biosafety 
Guidelines 
Training Short courses BTA/DGIS 
UNEP-GEF 
120,000 
na 
 
Source: Odame and Mbote (2000). 
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Excluding the international organisation, over US$ 15 million has been spent on tree, crop and livestock 
biotechnology-related research in Kenya in the last ten years. All agricultural biotechnology research 
projects are donor-funded for a period of five years. This raises the question of their sustainability. 
Apparently, donors as political actors are unlikely to operate without and direction of priorities and 
interests of their own countries. 
 
5  Key developments in modern biotechnology 
The controversial image of agricultural biotechnology industry in developed countries has driven a series 
of initiatives by the corporate sector in their activities in modern biotechnology transfer to developing 
countries. The discourse now includes a strong basis for how biotechnology can be harnessed to address 
the problems of poverty, hunger and malnutrition in developing countries. In Kenya, some scientists such 
as Dr Cyrus Ndiritu (the former Director of KARI) were aware that the public sector could not afford to 
access modern biotechnology because of its proprietary nature. They also learnt that making the private 
sector controlled biotechnology work for the benefit of society was almost impossible. As a result KARI 
sought to access the proprietary technology from the private sector through negotiation of licensing 
agreements for public goods research. The transfer of transgenic sweet potato and Bt Maize to KARI 
involved proprietary technologies donated by international organisation.  
The main modern biotechnology programme and policy-related initiatives include: 
 
1) Transgenic sweet potato for virus resistance, a collaborative public-private research project involving 
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), Monsanto, Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable 
Productivity (ABSP) project, International Service for Acquisition of Agbiotech Applications 
(ISAAA) and Michigan State University (MSU). 
2) The Insect Resistant Maize for Africa (IRMA) project, a Bt Maize project involving public and 
private partnerships among KARI, CIMMYT, Norvatis (now, Syngenta) Foundation for Sustainable 
Agriculture and Rockefeller Foundation.4  
3) The National Biosafety Framework Development Project by the National Council of Science and 
Technology (NCST), mainly publicly financed by various international agencies including the Dutch 
Ministry of International Cooperation (DGIS) and UNEP-GEF to establish a framework for the 
safe development and introduction of modern biotechnology in the country.  
 
While conceding that these initiatives contributed to the technical and legal capacity of national 
institutions such as KARI and placed them on the technology-frontier, some critics were concerned about 
the threat of weakening public research. In particular, they observed that the use of proprietary 
technology threatened to replace free exchange of knowledge and undermine the public goods produced 
through national research programmes. Furthermore, much of the effort was confined to capacity 
                                                 
4  Rockefeller Foundation supported workshops and stakeholders’ meeting in March 2000 (IRMA 2000: 1). 
11 
building for transgenic sweet potato and Bt Maize research at the national level, and not extended to the 
local level.  
Apart from these donated technologies, there are no examples of private-public research initiatives in 
the country. This has led critics, particularly through local print media to argue that these token 
technologies were used by the private sector as market openers for many of their GM crops in Kenya and 
elsewhere in Africa (Kenya Daily Nation 2000–2001). 
 
5.1 Human resource development 
Without comprehensive strategic research focus and definite objectives, developments in modern 
biotechnology to benefit resource-poor smallholders remain a mirage. Equally important is the effective 
communication and implementation of the development strategy with the relevant scientists and 
stakeholders. To this end, the management of modern biotechnology research initiatives in Kenya often 
seek to strengthen the country’s legal, scientific and management capacities. This requires strong scientific 
knowledge and linkages in technology generation – which were undeveloped in traditional biotechnology 
innovations. 
Wafula and Falconi (1998) estimated that by 1996 about 56 scientists were involved in biotechnology 
research activities in Kenya. These scientists accounted for 80 per cent of agricultural biotechnology 
research in the country. Scientists in international organisation located in the country performed the 
remainder.  
Of the 56 Kenyan scientists, 21 (or 38 per cent) were located in public universities. The public 
university scientists spent less than 10 per cent of their time on agricultural biotechnology-related 
research. Public university policy sought to ensure that scientists spent most of their work-time on 
teaching and other related activities. This implies that there only 35 full-time equivalent researchers in the 
entire national biotechnology research programme.  
The problem of building capacity is exacerbated by the deficiency of both quantity and quality of 
personnel in the relevant disciplines of modern biotechnology. In particular, the government and research 
institutions do not have specific training strategies for building national capacity in biotechnology, IPRs 
and biosafety regulations. Rather the research institutions have incorporated their training needs within 
the framework of individual research projects/programmes (KARI Training Masterplan 1997). To date, 
our research suggests that there are more than 60 scientists and technicians who have received training on 
basic and applied tissue, molecular biology, recombinant DNA and other aspects of biosafety and 
biopolicy. 
Over the years, capacity building in agricultural research has tended to focus on hardware (physical 
facilities) and post-graduate training in MSc and PhD. However, the rapid expansion of physical facilities 
implied a low proportion of scientists to total employees in a given research organisation. A large number 
of non-scientific staff relative to scientific staff were required to maintain the physical facilities (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.2 shows the quality of staff available in terms of ratio of PhDs, MSc and BSc/other technicians. It 
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is difficult to determine the optimum proportion of scientific staff. But agricultural research institutions 
often aim to achieve a target ratio of 30:30:60 for PhDs, MSc and BSc/other technicians. 
According to sources at the CGIAR centres in Nairobi, a majority of scientists in Kenya may have 
basic scientific knowledge in genetics and molecular biology, but lack practical experience to effectively 
apply their existing knowledge to modern biotechnology. For instance, universities produce scientists with 
BSc and MSc, but without practical training in modern biotechnology. The capacity of available scientists 
is also under-utilised due to low levels of funding in terms of scientific infrastructure and actual research 
grants and staff salaries (Odame and Mbote 2000). 
 
Table 5.1 The proportion of scientific staff to total employees 
Organisation Number of employees Number of scientific st Per cent (%) of scienti
JKUAT – Biotech centre 8 6 75 
Plant Pathology – UoN 30 10 33 
KARI-NVRC 342 35 10 
KEFRI  1200 8 1 
KETRI  690 10 8 
TRF 165 5 3 
Oserian Development C 4000a 9 0.2 
KEPHIS 315 80 25 
KIPO 85 21 25 
 
Note: A large number of these employees are casual labourers working in the flower industry. 
Source: Odame and Mbote (2000). 
 
Table 5.2 The ratio of scientific staff in selected research organisations 
Organisation Number of 
PhD staff 
Number of 
MSc staff 
Number of 
BSc/other staff 
Total 
JKUAT – Biotech 
centre 
1 1 4 6 
Plant Pathology – UoN 3 1 6 10 
KARI-NVRC 8 8 19 35 
KEFRI  1 1 6 8 
KETRI  1 1 8 10 
TRF 1 1 3 5 
Oserian Development 
Co. 
0 0 9 9 
 
Source: Odame and Mbote (2000). 
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Of the 11 laboratories surveyed, the majority are using tissue culture techniques. With the exception of 
international centres such as and ILRI and ICRAF, it appears that funding and reagents and relevant 
personnel are acute and serious constraints for laboratory capacity in Kenya. Universities, national 
agricultural research institutes (NARIs) and government regulatory agencies are particularly affected. 
These agencies also face the problem of finding suitable organisational and personal collaborators. 
While traditional biotechnology capacity building involved plant breeding and soil science, modern 
biotechnology has since the early 1990s focused research training in areas related to law, science and 
bureaucracy. At the same time, the role of the public research sector in modern biotechnology was limited 
due to declines in public investment and consequently R&D-inspired innovations are increasingly funded 
by the private sector.  
With increasing proprietary knowledge, the public research sector can only access the technology and 
the relevant human resource capacity training through collaboration with the private sector and donor 
funding. Some respondents pointed out that the approach was limited to a few scientists and short 
courses. There is thus limited contribution to the long-term strategy for achieving a critical mass of 
human resources needed to effectively engage in modern biotechnology. The country is currently facing a 
crisis of training and retaining scientists. The few scientists that are highly trained leave the country for 
better career opportunities in Europe, North America and Southern Africa. For instance, Kenya’s national 
newspaper the Daily Nation reported recently that 1 out of 14 scientists who had qualified with PhD in 
molecular biology and genomics was still in the country by the end of 2001. This may be attributable to 
under-utilisation of existing capacity as a result of poor scientific infrastructure. Much of the deficiency in 
modern biotechnology capacity is also related to intensification of science and costs. Therefore, effort is 
still needed to develop agricultural biotechnology strategies that work with diverse social groups and their 
particular constraints, and not against or around them. 
 
6  Case studies 
 
6.1 Basis for selection of case studies 
Transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize were selected as case studies because they highlight the impacts of 
globalisation on science and technology (S&T) policy. They also reflect international and national 
governance issues underpinning access to modern biotechnology for food and agricultural production in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, the two case studies complement each other. Sweet potato is an important 
food security crop for the poor, small-scale and women farmers. Meanwhile, maize is an important 
national food crop in the country. There is also a large body of secondary data on it and it has been the 
subject of lively debate among various stakeholders.  
Therefore, a comparison between a nationally important strategic crop like maize and a minor crop 
like sweet potato is likely to reveal some interesting lessons about who is setting the research agenda and 
its relation to national-level policy and globalisation factors. Furthermore, a comparison of the different 
ways in which policy treats maize and sweet potato is interesting given the centrality of maize and in light 
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of debates about price support mechanisms and subsidies, trade liberalisation, WTO obligations and the 
production fluctuations being experienced in the country currently. 
 
6.2 Sweet potato production in Kenya  
Sweet potato is cultivated on about 75,000 hectares spread over various agro-ecological zones in marginal 
and high potential areas (Qaim 1999; Gibbons 2000). While it is a versatile crop for meeting food security 
needs at the household level, its production has been declining due to high losses caused by diseases and 
lack of adequate planting materials (see Figure 6.1). In particular, a combination of viruses including the 
sweet potato feathery mottle virus (SPFMV) and the sweet potato chlorotic stunt virus account for losses 
amounting to about 80 per cent of the yields (KARI 2000). Kenya’s average sweet potato yield stands at 6 
tha-1, less than half the world’s average of 14 tha-1 (Mungai 2000). China has, for instance, realised yields of 
18 tha-1 (Hinchee 1998). The advent of modern biotechnology motivated researchers to conceive a 
collaborative programme to address the low yields of African sweet potato. 
 
6.2.1 Transgenic sweet potato project 
The development of the virus resistant sweet potato began in 1991 with financial support from the 
USAID. The project was designed to address production problems and losses emanating from SPFMV. 
The key actors in the project were Monsanto and KARI scientists, who developed suitable 
biotransformation and plant regeneration protocols. Technical backstopping and additional support came 
from the ABSP and ISAAA.5 Monsanto donated (free-of-charge) the gene of interest and initial research 
support on genetic transformation of six Kenyan sweet potato varieties against SPFMV at Monsanto 
laboratories in the US. At the initial stages of the project, only one of the six local sweet potato varieties, 
CPT 560, was successfully transformed using the donated coat protein gene. But by 1997, over 195 lines 
of CPT 560 had been transformed (Gibbons 2000). 
The actual transfer of the transgenic sweet potato technology from Monsanto to KARI only took 
place in the year 2000, after a delay of at least two years. Under-developed biosafety guidelines and 
regulations and inadequate human resources and infrastructure for risk assessment caused this. It was also 
the first introduction of a genetically modified crop into the country and it coincided with heightened 
global concern and debate over GMOs. The National Biosafety Committee (NBC) gave KARI an 
approval in December 1999 and this was followed by issuance of a plant importation permit by the Kenya 
Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS). At present, on-farm trials are being conducted in various 
parts of the country before the technology is diffused to farmers (Odhiambo 2000).  
 
                                                 
5  Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) is USAID-funded project to assist developing countries in 
the development and management of the tools and products of agricultural biotechnology. The International 
Service for Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) is a private international organisation created to 
facilitate and assist developing countries acquire modern biotechnology applications. 
15 
Figure 6.1 Kenya: sweet potato area and yield, 1961–2001 
 
Source: FAO database. 
 
6.2.2 Lessons from the transgenic sweet potato project 
One of the limitations of the sweet potato project is that it will only address a specific production 
constraint. In other words, it does not address multiple problems leading to low yields of sweet potato in 
Kenya. This raises the question of the extent to which the technology will meet the farmers’ preferred 
agronomic and other characteristics. A user-relevant technology should be able to cater and satisfy the 
diverse needs of farmers in terms of cultural preferences, varied tastes and nutritional qualities. These are 
important determinants for its adoption. According to sources at the International Potato Centre (CIP) 
based in Nairobi, there is need for at least two sweet potato clones per each agro ecological zone.  
An ex ante economic analysis of the potential gains from transgenic sweet potato introduction in 
Kenya conducted in 1999 shows significant returns for small-scale farmers. It was estimated that by using 
transgenic virus-resistant varieties farmers will be able to increase their sweet potato yields by 18 per cent. 
According to results of model simulations, the virus-resistant varieties are estimated to produce an 
aggregate annual benefit of 5.4 million US dollars. However, the main challenge in the project could be 
establishing a system for distribution of disease-free sweet potato planting materials. It is worth noting 
that the ex ante economic analysis assumes an efficient seed potato system to serve the farmers. However, 
acquiring transgenic sweet potato planting materials may be more demanding compared to the existing 
sources where farmers reproduce and freely exchange planting materials among themselves (Qaim 1999).  
In countries that have already experimented with transgenic sweet potato, for instance, Mexico, 
experience shows that farmers do not use commercial seed potato because of the high cost of the seed 
(Qaim 1999). In Kenya, a study commissioned by GTZ to address the consumption characteristics of 
sweet potato in Kenya shows that the supply of certified seed by KARI and other parastatal organisation 
has not been efficient. Furthermore, efforts by institutions such as CIP, have focussed more on technical 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
Years
A
re
a 
(00
0 
ha
)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Yi
el
d 
(M
t/h
a)
Area (000ha) Yield (Mt/ha)
16 
aspects such as flour processing and post-harvest protection as opposed to delivery of extension services 
and distribution of seeds. Therefore, the project is faced with the challenge of linking R & D generally, 
and science particularly, to production. 
 
6.3 Maize production in Kenya 
Maize is grown in 90 per cent of all Kenyan farms. Its importance to the Kenyan economy ranges from 
food provision, income generation to creation of employment both directly and indirectly (Pearson et al. 
1995). In particular, maize is an important food crop, and shortages and famine in the country are usually 
linked to its poor yields.  
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the performance of the maize-sub sector in Kenya’s economy was 
impressive. This period was characterised by expansion in the area under maize and increase in the yields 
of the crop (see Figure 6.2).  
Government intervention in maize production was mainly handled through the National Cereals and 
Produce Board (NCPB). The Board was involved in the marketing of maize and other cereals with the 
objective of achieving price stabilisation and food security (Nyangito and Okello 1998). The early success 
and growth spearheaded by technical change and enabling government policies began to decline in mid 
1980s and worsened in 1990s. During the 1990s, maize production has been affected by a combination of 
factors including unprecedented demographic trends leading to massive sub-division of land, and market 
distortions resulting from the implementation of liberalisation policies. Other problems include harsh 
climatic conditions, scarcity of good agricultural land for expansion, and a high incidence of pests and 
diseases. According to the 17 July 2003 email communication from Stephen Mugo, The Kenya IRMA 
Project Coordinator, ‘[m]ayor diseases include maize streak virus (MSV), gray leaf spot (GLS), northern 
leaf (E. Turcicum) leaf rust, and rots, while major pests are maize stem borers), the larger grain borer 
(LGB), and the maize weevil, all of which account for heavy losses’. 
The area under maize cultivation has stabilised at around 1.4 million hectares with an average maize 
yield of about 2 tonnes per hectare, but potential exists for increasing the yield to over 6 tonnes per 
hectare through increased use of improved seeds, fertilisers and good crop management (Government of 
Kenya 1997). While efforts have been put in place to increase maize production, the demand has been 
high and occasionally outstrips supply. The deficit has in most cases been partly met through commercial 
importation and food relief from international agencies like the World Food Programme.  
Analysis of the major problems facing maize production shows that for the past 30–40 years, maize 
research in Kenya has been concentrated around breeding for higher yields, while ignoring breeding for 
pest and disease tolerance. As a result, small-scale farmers grow maize under very poor pest and disease 
management conditions. Stem borers pose one of the most serious threats to the production of maize 
with losses estimated at about 15 per cent of the harvest. This is equivalent to 400, 000 tons of maize 
valued at US$ 90 million (De Groote 2000). This problem has continued to intensify as most subsistence 
farmers are resource-constrained and cannot meet crop protection costs. Climatic factors such as drought 
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combine with the virus to aggravate production losses. In years of surplus production, post-harvest losses 
are high mainly due to poor and limited storage facilities. 
 
Figure 6.2 Kenya: maize area and yield, 1961–2001 
Source: FAO database. 
 
6.3.1 Insect resistant maize for Africa project  
In response to the above concerns, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) 
and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) launched the Insect Resistant Maize for Africa 
(IRMA) project in 1999, with financial support from the Novartis Foundation6. The overall objective of 
project is to increase maize production and food security through the development and deployment of 
insect resistant maize that is adapted to various agro ecological zones in Kenya. The new maize variety will 
be developed with Bt genes that are harmful (i.e. repel or kill) to local populations of stem borers. Maize 
leaves with Bt toxins were introduced from Mexico and these are undergoing trials at KARI NARL 
Biotechnology Centre (Nairobi). Other components of the project include procedures for diffusing the 
technology to farmers and assessment of the socio-economic impacts of the new maize variety in the 
entire Kenyan agricultural system (IRMA 2000). 
 
                                                 
6  According to the 17 July 2003 email from Stephen Mugo, The Kenya IRMA Project Coordinator, ‘Norvatis 
Foundation for Sustainable Development was the initial partner in the project. Most recently, the Syngenta 
Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture was established and over various projects of the Norvatis Foundation, 
including the IRMA project. This has in no way changed the project, its goals, nor its values’. 
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6.3.2 Lessons learned from Bt maize project 
Like the case of transgenic sweet potato project, this project has a number of limitations. While Bt gene 
offers resistance against the stem-borers, they will not solve problems posed by other pests and diseases 
such as maize streak virus. Further, Bt maize does not have genes of resistance to weeds such as striga. 
This implies that technology will only partially help farmers in reducing crop protection costs. In essence, 
the two projects have contributed to the technical capacity building for KARI scientists, but they are yet 
to show a shift in the behaviour of these scientists towards closer interaction with user groups in priority 
setting in agricultural biotechnology. 
 
7  Policy and regulations 
 
7.1 Intellectual Property Rights and trade 
 
7.1.1 Adopting IP-related laws 
International forces and interests have influenced the development of intellectual property laws in Kenya. 
Kenya has a long history of IP protection with the first patent registered in the country in 1912. Like 
other laws in Kenya, IP laws are a heritage of the colonial past. Indeed until 1989, Kenya had a dependent 
patent system. In 1990 however, the Kenya Industrial Property Office (KIPO) was created with the 
enactment of the Industrial Property Act. Cap. 509 of the Laws of Kenya. KIPO was given the mandate 
of examining, granting and registering industrial property rights under the provisions of the Industrial 
Property Act and the Trade marks Act Cap. 506. This signified a major shift from the prior system where 
Kenyan authorities merely re-registered IPRs granted in the United Kingdom.  
With the creation of World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, and the coming into force of the 
TRIPS agreement, all members of WTO were required to revise their national patent laws to conform to 
the requirements of TRIPS and WIPO guidelines. Kenya as a member of WTO and a signatory to TRIPS, 
was obligated to amend the Industrial Property Act. This came into effect when the Industrial Property 
Bill was passed by the parliament on 13 June 2001.7 The process led to institutional transition. KIPO, 
initially a Government department under the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry was transformed 
into a more autonomous and independent patent office, the Kenya Intellectual Property Institute (KIPI). 
The autonomy gave KIPI a wider decision-making mandate in the screening and granting of industrial 
property rights. It is also mandated to carry out training courses. The institute is expected to shift from 
financial reliance on the government and raise its own funds (Aluoko n.d.). There is no doubt that the 
government and some international bodies meet part of KIPI’s financial needs. In the past KIPO (now 
KIPI) has received support from WIPO in areas such as human resources capacity training and IP-related 
computer hardware and software.  
                                                 
7   Note that KIPO was created in 1990 with the enactment of the Industrial Property Act. Cap. 509 in while the 
Industrial Property Bill passed in 2001 amended Cap. 509 and transformed KIPO to KIPI. 
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Although KIPI is positioned as one of the best intellectual property institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the organisation is faced with many challenges such as drafting of suitable laws such as the sui 
generis system, and managing day to day issues related to enforcement and policing of IPRs. One area that 
needs urgent intervention of KIPI is the strengthening of IPR regimes at the institutional level. Many 
Kenyan institutions lack or have underdeveloped IPR regimes and policies (BIO-EARN 2001a). KIPI is 
also confronted with the daunting challenge of developing appropriate policies and laws to harmonise the 
apparent conflict between TRIPS and the CBD, in particular on issues revolving around Article 8 (j) of 
the CBD. It appears that the Industrial Property Act (2001) was swiftly enacted to conform to standards 
set by TRIPS. From a national development perspective however, the Act is silent on a number of crucial 
concerns. For instance, it does not address issues such as protection of genetic resources and knowledge 
held by local communities. While Kenya is a signatory to a number of binding international conventions 
and agreements that touch on these issues and is participating in discussions on appropriate mechanisms 
at that level, the majority of Kenyans, including farmers, researchers, manufacturers and other actors are 
unaware of these developments and little effort is made to help them understand the relevant implications 
of these policies. Foreigners account for most of the applicants to KIPI. Kenyans have for instance, filed 
very few patents because the various players are not aware of their rights as inventors and the procedures 
for getting their rights protected. 
 
7.1.2 IPRs, research and product development 
Article 27 of TRIPS requires that patents be granted in all areas of technology including biotechnology. 
The Industrial Property Act, 2001 provides for the grant of patents for biotechnology innovations. For a 
biotechnological invention to be patentable, it must be ‘new, involve an inventive step and [be] industrially 
applicable’ (Section 7). The Act excludes plant and animal varieties from patentability. Under TRIPS, 
plant varieties are required to be protected either by patents or an effective sui generis system or a 
combination of both. Kenya has not yet developed a sui generis system. Kenya has had a plant variety 
protection legislation, which until the mid-1990s was characterised as largely dormant in terms of variety 
protection. The Seeds and Plant Varieties legislation (Cap 326 of the Laws of Kenya) became functional in 
1975 but was confined to seed certification. The Act was revised in 1978 and 1991 to respond to shifting 
developments in international trade and the seed industry. The revised Act was to a large extent in 
conformity with the requirements of the 1978 version of UPOV Convention. This enabled Kenya to 
accede to the Convention in 1999. As per the stipulations of the convention, new plant varieties in Kenya 
had to be protected by Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) granted for plant varieties that are distinct, 
homogenous and stable. The Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services (KEPHIS) was established in 
1996 to regulate importation and exportation of plant materials and the trade in bio-safety control 
organisms in accordance with the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). KEPHIS 
administers plant breeders’ rights in Kenya and is the liaison office for the UPOV convention. A Plant 
Breeders Rights office was created in 1997 under KEPHIS to handle matters related to PBRs (BIOEARN 
2001a). 
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7.1.3 Application of IPRs to the transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize 
The transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize were introduced into Kenya as “technology donations” by 
international organisations and as crops directed towards enhancing food security. KARI is, for instance, 
permitted by Monsanto to protect the transformed transgenic sweet potato varieties under plant breeders’ 
rights or any other appropriate IPR instrument. The non-exclusive, royalty-free licensing agreement 
signed between KARI and Monsanto allows KARI to use the technology and share it with other African 
countries in future. Syngenta Foundation financed (and provided some technical assistance to) the IRMA 
project as a corporate contribution to sustainable development in Kenya. As mentioned earlier, Syngenta 
Foundation inherited this role from Norvatis Foundation for Sustainable Development. According to a 
source at Syngenta Company in 2002, Syngenta Foundation also inherited some legal issues – mainly due 
to lack of communication and prior consultations. Apparently, KARI and CIMMYT scientists were 
working with Bt technology without being fully aware of its IPR implications, especially with respect to 
Freedom to Operate (FTO). However, the same source confirmed that the issue was being addressed 
amicably. Given that the researchers involved often lack relevant IPR information regarding the 
biotechnology tools and processes, CIMMYT commissioned a study to investigate IPR implications and 
other limitations of releasing Bt maize in Kenya as a public good. 
The Strategic World Initiative for Technology Transfer (SWIFTT), Cornell University, undertook 
the study known as “freedom to operate (FTO)”. The study revealed that unlike other projects involving 
transgenic crops, Bt maize had no FTO limitations. However, it would be subject to fewer intellectual 
property restrictions (IRMA 2001). What is implied by fewer intellectual property restrictions is not clear. 
For instance, the report states that KARI may have to negotiate with IPRs of third parties like commercial 
ventures before Bt maize is commercialised (ibid.). 
While sweet potato and Bt maize are meant to be public goods, it can be seen that they are entangled 
in some form of IPR implications. This implies that ultimately, farmers may have to pay for increased 
transaction costs of accessing certified seeds and planting materials. Access to the technology by farmers 
is vital and related to this issue is how the distribution of seeds of Bt maize and sweet potato are going to 
be organised. 
In transforming transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize germplasm to come up with varieties adapted 
to various agro-ecological zones in Kenya, KARI scientists will draw on the knowledge of farmers and the 
landraces grown in various parts of the country. For many years these farmers have been custodians of 
traditional varieties adapted to various climatic conditions and suitable for meeting food security needs. 
Unfortunately, PBRs exclude the rights and traditional knowledge of farmers and do not recognise them 
as key players and part and parcel of the breeding process. PBRs fail to appreciate the fact that the 
breeding process begins at the farmer’s level before moving to the laboratories. This contradicts the 
notion of farmers’ rights and protection of traditional knowledge as indicated in Article 8(j) of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). It will be interesting to see what approach Kenya takes to the 
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domestication of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture which 
has provisions on farmers’ rights which are distinct from breeders’ rights. 
 
7.1.4 Implications of IPRs for public research and farmers’ access to biotechnology  
Before the introduction of PBRs, KARI as a public research organisation was involved in breeding crop 
varieties that were exclusively treated as public goods. This is likely to change with the liberalisation of the 
seed industry, which requires farmers to pay royalties for the varieties that they purchase. Given that plant 
breeding is a long and expensive affair, and financial support from the government is declining, even 
KARI may be compelled to charge royalty fees to help fund further variety development and provide 
rewards and incentives to researchers involved in breeding (BIOEARN 2001a). Farmers will start paying 
for varieties that they have been involved in nurturing instead of sharing benefits accruing from them.8  
By December 2001, about 541 applications of PBR had been received with 259 applications 
originating from Kenyan breeders. Most of the applications covered horticultural crops as opposed to key 
food security crops (Figure 7.1). More than half of the applications came from industrialised countries. 
These were mainly companies or individuals who wanted to protect certain varieties for the export 
market. Some critics point out that the pressure to put in place PBRs came from breeders in the 
horticultural industry, especially with the enforcement of plant breeders’ rights in the international 
markets. This could be true as roses for export accounted for 39 per cent of PBRs applications in Kenya 
by December 2001. Applications originated from France, the Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand, 
Spain, Israel, USA, Italy and Ecuador. Other horticultural crops accounted for 37 per cent while key food 
crops such as maize, sweet potato, beans, Irish potato, wheat, millet and sorghum accounted for only 24 
per cent of the applications. 
 
Figure 7.1 PBR applications in Kenya 
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Source: Computed from BIO-EARN (2001a). 
                                                 
8  See Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
22 
Figure 7.2 PBRs applications in Kenya as of Dec. 2001 
Source: Computed from BIO-EARN (2001a). 
 
Before the coming into force of PBRs, new plant varieties were bred exclusively as public goods (not 
attracting royalties) by public research institutions such as KARI. This clearly shows that PBRs are 
tailored towards strengthening commercial crops and not food security crops. Indeed the development of 
PBRs under UPOV was geared towards providing incentives to commercial farmers (Kameri-Mbote and 
Cullet 1999). The introduction of PBRs in Kenya’s context can be described as a way of encouraging 
monoculture leading to erosion of genetic diversity and concentrating benefits of “new” varieties in the 
hands of commercial companies, all at the expense of poor farmers (Cullet 2001). According to KEPHIS, 
farmers who depended on old varieties and recycling of seeds suffered when PBRs were fully enforced. 
 
7.2 Globalisation and trade  
Measures to alleviate poverty and curb food insecurity in Kenya should be viewed within the broader 
scope of liberalisation and the impacts of regional and international trade regimes such as Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community and WTO 
respectively. WTO as an international governance regime for trade is and will be a major determinant of 
the extent to which new agricultural technologies can contribute to poverty eradication and increased 
food security in developing countries. Since inception, WTO has advocated for liberalisation reforms 
through removal of market barriers and opening up of markets for increased movement of goods and 
services.  
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The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the WTO places emphasis on minimising domestic support 
for agriculture. It requires countries to withdraw subsidies, decontrol market prices, and other kinds of 
support directed towards agricultural sectors. Liberalisation of the already weak agricultural economy has 
impacted negatively on the production, processing and marketing of agricultural produce in Kenya. 
Smallholder farmers are feeling the impact of the AoA because their means of production are limited and 
yet they are being forced to compete globally. Farmers in the grain sector have been affected severely by 
the escalating costs of inputs such as fertilisers, seeds and chemicals on one end and poor and 
discouraging market prices for their produce on the other hand. The environment in which farmers 
operate has become difficult taking into account the fact that they have no access to credit facilities and 
the government extension system has collapsed. 
Before implementation of liberalisation reforms started in Kenya, the National Cereals and Produce 
Board (NCPB) was charged with the responsibility of regulating movement of maize and stabilising 
prices. NCPB ensured movement of maize produce from the surplus producing regions to the deficit 
areas therefore equalising maize supply in various parts of the country (Nyangito and Okello 1998). When 
the reform process intensified, the role of NCPB was marginally reduced to that of maintaining strategic 
national food reserves (Nyoro and Nguyo n.d.). Since then, uncertainty has dominated the maize market 
with prices fluctuating widely in response to both seasonal and political forces.  
Introduction of Bt maize comes at a time when the maize sector in Kenya faces imminent collapse 
because of problems related to high prices of inputs and meagre and fluctuating market prices for maize. 
While one of the potential benefits of Bt maize is increased yields per unit area, this may be 
counterproductive if there is increased surplus produce leading to more serious marketing problems. 
Since the government no longer controls the market prices for maize, traders are at liberty to fix them. 
The regulatory and monitoring vacuum created by the pulling out of NCPB, has attracted middlemen and 
millers in the market place leading to exploitation of farmers. The prices offered to farmers are far below 
the costs incurred in production. For instance, in April 2002, maize was retailing at Kshs 400 per bag. At 
the same time a bag of maize seed was going for Kshs 3,300 while a bag of fertiliser was going for about 
Kshs 1,500 (Daily Nation 2002).  
This scenario has occasionally triggered demonstrations by farmers threatening to boycott 
production of maize (Daily Nation 2001). In seasons of surplus maize produce, NCPB comes under 
pressure to buy maize at prices proposed by farmers. NCPB finds itself in a disadvantaged position to 
respond to the demands of farmers due to inadequate budgetary allocation from the government to buy 
maize or lack of storage facilities to accommodate the surplus. These problems have been exacerbated by 
influx of cheap maize from neighbouring countries and massive imports by powerful and money-minded 
politicians.  
Overall, an increase in supply of maize from both domestic and external sources leads to sharp and 
significant decreases in the prices for maize. During times of acute shortages import taxes on maize are 
reduced or waived altogether. This leads to hefty imports that exceed the actual deficit. Farmers find 
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themselves on the losing end because imported maize is usually cheaper than local maize. This is due to 
the fact that some neighbouring countries such as Uganda are members of COMESA, which allows them 
to trade with partner countries like Kenya without any trade barriers.  
Additionally, WTO categorises countries as either developing or least developed. Some of the 
poorest developing countries have been exempted from reduction commitments. This implies that they 
can continue subsidising and supporting their agricultural sectors. Kenya is classified as a developing 
country and therefore obligated to reduce subsidies and other forms of support. This has led to dumping 
of subsidised food to the Kenyan market leading to suppression of prices. For a country whose lifeline 
and economy depends on agriculture in terms of food security, employment, economic growth and 
poverty reduction, this constitutes narrowing of livelihood options both directly and indirectly. In this 
regard, there have been proposals that Kenya should withdraw its membership from COMESA to save 
the local agricultural sector (Daily Nation 2002). Going by the current trends and high level of uncertainty, 
one can argue that biotechnology is not a magic bullet. While productivity will be increased, high yields 
will be of no consequence if the various diverse and complex structural constraints are not mitigated. 
 
7.3 Biosafety guidelines and regulations 
There is an inexorable link between the development of biotechnology and the existence of a biosafety 
system. Debates about the safety of biotechnological products and processes, specifically genetically 
modified organisms, have raised countries’ concerns to establish risk assessment and management 
systems as a necessary function of biotechnology development. This is the case in Kenya where the 
research on the transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize have spurred and accelerated biopolicy 
development. 
 
7.3.1 The national biosafety system 
Kenya was the first member of the CBD to sign the Biosafety Protocol when it was opened for signature 
in Nairobi on 24 May 2000. Less than two years later, Kenya ratified the Protocol on 24 January 2002. 
This demonstrates the country’s intention and willingness to engage in safe handling, use and 
transboundary movement of living modified organisms, effectively engaging in modern biotechnology. 
Kenya was however already working on a biosafety system prior to the conclusion of the Biosafety 
Protocol. Indeed the increasing application of biotechnology in Kenya had raised the need to formulate 
appropriate biosafety regulations and guidelines to streamline biotechnology R and D. The National 
Council for Science and Technology (NCST) played the role of coordinating the formulation of the 
guidelines as part of the UNEP-GEF Pilot Project on the development of biosafety frameworks and 
regulations. Kenya’s guidelines were published in 1998. The guidelines cover various aspects of risk 
assessment and management of modern biotechnology including the release of genetically modified 
organisms into the environment (NCST 1998). The need to establish a National Biosafety Committee 
(NBC) was recommended in the guidelines and the NCST was designated by the government to form the 
Committee.  
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The NBC was constituted and charged with the mandate of handling technical and policy issues 
involved in introducing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the country. Institutions represented 
on the Committee include NCST, KARI, KIPI, KEPHIS, KEMRI, ILRI, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (MOA&RD), Ministry of Education Science and Technology, Department of 
Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing (DRSRS), University of Nairobi (UON), Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), Kenyatta University (KU), Office of the President 
(OP), Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) and the National Environment Secretariat (NES). 
In spite of the progress made so far, the guidelines and regulations have not yet been promulgated 
into law. This implies that the legal instrument for enforcing them is lacking. The process of enacting 
biosafety law has been dragging due to lack of political commitment and little understanding of 
biotechnology and biosafety concerns among the policy-makers and legislators. This seems to be the 
prevailing situation although the Africa Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum (ABSF) and other institutions 
have organised a number of meetings to improve the level of understanding on the various aspects of 
biotechnology and biosafety. NBC is also faced with financial difficulties and lack of a permanent 
secretariat with a critical mass of experts. NBC does not have a budgetary allocation from the government 
and an adequate number of in-house scientists who are competent in diverse areas of biotechnology. 
These two aspects are vital for strengthening the operations of the Committee.  
Kenya’s biosafety regulations and guidelines were prepared before adoption of the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. As such, revision is required to bring the guidelines into conformity with the 
various provisions of the Protocol. On another level, the Protocol has taken a lot of time before coming 
into force due to the slow rate of ratification. At the time of writing, only 37 countries had ratified the 
Protocol, yet 50 ratifications are required before the Protocol comes into force. It is expected that the 
requisite number of ratifications will be attained in 2003.  
Kenya’s guidelines do not give direction on the labelling of GMOs and how the modalities of 
handling movement of GM crops from the laboratories to the farms should be handled. The movement 
of transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize from KARI stations to farmers’ fields is drawing closer but the 
level of awareness of biotechnology and biosafety issues at the farmers’ level is lacking. Once the Protocol 
comes into force, Kenya is going to be under an obligation to have in place a risk assessment and 
management regime in congruence with the Protocol. This calls for diligence in getting the mechanisms 
put in place and operationalised. While appreciating that NGOs such as the ABSF have been instrumental 
in raising the level of awareness on biosafety and biotechnology, such efforts are currently confined 
among policy makers, scientists and, to a lesser extent, media circles. Adequate and balanced information 
is yet to reach the resource poor farmers who are the final users and beneficiaries of the technologies 
being developed. Public awareness at the grass roots level is crucial and should be enhanced to point out 
clearly and objectively the benefits and risks of adopting the technologies developed, so far. Indeed 
Article 23 of the Protocol requires that the public be made aware and participate in decision-making on 
living modified organisms. Inadequacy of information creates uncertainties and this may act as a barrier to 
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technology adoption. But this is hardly an inevitable outcome. Kenya is among countries that are 
benefiting from the second phase of UNEP-GEF enabling biosafety project aimed at supporting 
countries to implement the already existing frameworks. While it is certain that various implementation 
issues at the national level will be covered, it is not clear whether capacity building needs at the local level 
(farmers) will be addressed. 
 
7.3.2 Food safety 
With regard to food safety, Kenya’s system based on the Food and Drugs Act has been largely concerned 
with wholesomeness of food and procedures against pest infestation. Food standards are the 
responsibility of the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS). KEBS is charged with the responsibility of 
ascertaining quality standards of food and non-food products. The Biosafety guidelines and regulations 
are silent on the issue of labelling of genetically modified products or products containing GMO 
ingredients but the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) is a member of the NBC. The mandate of NBC 
that is relevant for food safety, is the development of relevant standards and mechanisms for assessing 
the safety of genetically modified foods. This has not yet been done. According to senior officers of the 
Bureau, Kenya is still implementing (KS 05-40) Kenya Standard Labelling of Pre-packed Foods 
established in line with the requirements of Codex Alimentarius Commission. The existing standards do 
not contain any information on mechanisms and systems for handling GMOs (BIOEARN 2001b). 
 
7.4 Potential impacts on food security 
 
7.4.1 IPRs, trade and food security 
The impact of IPRs on food security in Kenya is at the moment negligible. Farmers can grow their own 
food with minimal IPRs restrictions. For many years the common practice among Kenyan farmers has 
been that of saving and exchanging seeds season after season. While some farmers used improved 
varieties before the liberalisation period, they were mostly commercial farmers and to a larger extent their 
motivation was subsidised costs and a good public research and extension system. Following the removal 
of subsidies and decontrol of input prices, farmers are reverting to the use of local seed varieties. But with 
increased IP protection and liberalisation of the seed industry, this is not likely to last for long. The 
section on IPRs has highlighted some of the difficulties that farmers are likely to encounter.  
Concerning issues of trade, maize is both a food and cash crop while sweet potato is mainly a food 
crop at the household level. In some parts of Kenya, food security is achieved by selling maize to earn 
income to buy food, while in others maize is grown as a staple food crop for subsistence consumption. 
Over the years, the area under maize production has reduced significantly. Annual national yields have 
declined as well. It is in this context that biotechnology is seen as a promising technology for increasing 
yields at the national level. However, it should be noted that biotechnology is not a quick solution to 
problems of food security in Kenya. Achieving food security requires a multi-dimensional approach. It is 
not just about increasing yields per unit area. It also entails the way food is distributed or availability of 
27 
income to purchase it. At the same time, increasing food production at the national level does not 
necessarily translate to food security at the household level. Food security is situational and context 
specific. In some areas food insecurity is not due to lack of food but lack of income to buy food (CIDSE 
2000). In some years, depending on erratic climatic conditions, Kenya realises surplus production of 
maize. While at such times the national food security situation is usually favourable, in other parts of the 
country, household food security goals are never realised due to a complex web of factors. Poor 
infrastructure and insecurity curtails distribution in hardship areas such as the arid and semi-arid regions. 
Political proclivity and exclusion often leads to unavailability of food in some areas. In areas where food is 
available in the markets, problems related to access arise. Families living below the poverty line are too 
poor to buy food.  
Issues related to marketing of maize produce will determine the extent to which biotechnology can 
contribute to food security. Unless such issues are addressed accordingly, poor and fluctuating prices of 
maize on one side and the high cost of inputs on the other, are likely to stifle production. If it turns out 
that producing maize is not rewarding, farmers who depend on maize as a cash crop may shift to other 
crops. 
 
7.4.2 Biosafety, food-safety and security 
Issues of biosafety in general and food safety in particular surround the introduction of Bt maize and 
transgenic sweet potato in Kenya. The section on biosafety guidelines and regulations has clearly shown 
the weak and strong points of Kenya’s biosafety system. A major food safety concern is the issue of relief 
food that is donated to the country during years of acute famine and food shortages and in particular, the 
possible health and environmental risks that may have come along with such shipments. For example in 
the year 2000, Kenya received 21,000 tons of corn from the US government to relieve 3 million Kenyans 
that were threatened with starvation. The “humanitarian” assistance came in response to several appeals 
by President Moi to the international community to assist the government in meeting food requirements 
of the famine victims. Surprisingly, this food was not subjected to the biosafety system. While it is not 
documented that a Presidential appeal can supersede the existing biosafety mechanisms and procedures, 
Kenya’s biosafety guidelines and regulations were not invoked in assessing the safety of the relief food. 
The lack of capacity and facilities on the part of KEBS to inspect and screen the relief food donated 
determined how the food was handled. Furthermore, liberalisation has led to a large influx of food 
products from various parts of the world to the Kenyan markets. KEBS lacks the requisite capacity to test 
and detect presence or absence of GMOs in food products entering the country or those already on the 
market shelves.  
What is happening in other parts of the world testifies to the fact that genetically modified products 
can easily find their way into the country without the knowledge of the relevant authorities. In October 
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2001, in Japan, StarLink9 was found in food products where it had not been approved even for animal 
feed. In mid 2002, the government of Zimbabwe rejected an offer of 10,000 metric tonnes of corn from 
the US on grounds of fear and uncertainty. The shipment was meant to salvage the lives of over three 
million people that were faced with starvation. The consignment was rejected on the basis that some 
farmers may end up planting part of the genetically modified corn leading to massive irreversible 
consequences. Zambia has similarly rejected GM food aid on the grounds of fear and uncertainty. These 
concerns have policy implications for Kenya as a country that has been depending on relief food for a 
number of years. There are possibilities that some farmers in the country may have re-planted part of the 
yellow maize received.  
The issue of risk assessment and management of transgenic sweet potato and Bt maize in farms is 
another concern that the NBC has to grapple with. For the two technologies to generate the anticipated 
results while minimising potential risks, the capacity of farmers to conduct risk assessment and 
management at the local level has to be enhanced. For instance, farmers ought to understand the 
dynamics of gene flow in maize cropping systems and adjust their cultivation practices to suit such 
dynamics. Unless appropriate resistance management strategies are developed, it may not take long before 
the stem borers develop resistance against the Bt gene. There may be possibilities of the transgenic sweet 
potato developing resistance against the mottle virus and other closely related viruses. The average land 
holding size in Kenya is very small and therefore the possibility of gene flow from Bt maize or transgenic 
sweet potato to adjacent conventional varieties may affect the adoption rate of farmers aiming to preserve 
non-GM identity.  
On the other hand, the genetically modified varieties are likely to erode the genetic diversity of local 
varieties and make farmers dependent on a few commercial varieties. Should either the sweet potato or Bt 
maize become super weeds, farmers will have to pay for increased crop protection costs. In fact this will 
dampen prospects of increasing yields and achieving food security. Therefore, breakdown of resistance 
has to be reported early enough and handled promptly to retard negative consequences (Songa 2002). 
Given that the government extension system has collapsed and NGOs at the grassroots level lack the 
scientific and technological capacity to work with farmers, these are likely to be major challenges. 
 
8  Summary and conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated that for modern biotechnology research to have long-term and wider 
positive social impact in Kenya, changes in policies and institutions are mandatory to ensure that it 
benefits the majority of Kenya’s population who are dependent on smallholder farming. For instance, 
critical issues such as biosafety and food safety, loss of biodiversity and IPRs need to be given attention to 
allow safe development and transfer of the relevant agricultural biotechnology applications. These 
                                                 
9   StarLink is a type of corn produced by Aventis Corporation and was approved by federal authorities in 1998 as 
an animal feed. But because the corn has been genetically modified in a way that makes it more difficult to 
breakdown in the human gut, the agencies have refused to approve it for human use. 
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complex issues require institutional and national capacity building through regional and international 
collaboration. However, new R&D policy and legal frameworks alone may not be sufficient, unless there 
is change towards multi-disciplinary approaches, leadership/supervisory training and problem-solving 
skills, especially for research and extension personnel, linkages with private sector and meaningful 
participation of farmers and their organisation.  
Given the declining public spending, institutions in Kenya are under pressure to generate revenue. 
Already some private firms are gradually becoming involved in funding biotechnology research projects 
through contract research with KARI. It is also important to note that despite serious policy and 
institutional constraints, there is enthusiasm, although sometimes guarded, among many Kenyan scholars 
and practitioners concerning modern biotechnology for food security. Ensuring clarity about 
biotechnology in national agricultural development policy is definitely a critical factor.  
In conclusion, there are five key points to summarise from this paper. First, alleviating rural poverty 
and food insecurity in Kenya requires changes at the local, national and international levels because of the 
inter-connectedness of agricultural systems and development in general. Second, developments in 
agricultural biotechnology will require slow and careful policy formulation, planning and implementation 
in order to improve food security of smallholders and reduce possible negative and socio-economic 
impacts such as loss of biodiversity, food safety and further marginalisation of smallholders. Third, the 
Kenyan public sector will continue to play an important role in the biotechnology development because 
this area of research is crucial to the national interests and the survival of rural communities.  
Fourth, the development and transfer of agricultural biotechnology as advocated by international 
agencies and their national collaborators in the developing countries are risky undertakings, particularly 
when they proceed faster than the capacity of the state and its institutions to cope with the emergent 
technologies. Ensuring that effective policy and institutional mechanisms not only exist but also are 
enforced in Kenya is especially critical to the capacity of the public research sector to respond to national 
and local food security needs. This has to move in tandem with capacity to manage risk, which is critical 
to engagement in safe handling, use and transboundary movement of LMOs. Fifth and finally, while 
recognising that agricultural biotechnology has potential to alleviate food insecurity in rural Kenya, its 
programmes must be strongly linked to the interests of smallholder farmers and institutions that support 
local participation. This paper has argued that if these five issues are addressed, modern biotechnology 
can potentially contribute to food security and rural development in Kenya. 
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